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I. INTRODUCTION 
Countless books, articles, web sites, and blogs discuss resiliency; 
most major scientific and industry non-governmental organizations 
have produced resiliency reports;1 and many universities have held re-
siliency symposia. One 2013 report identified nearly fifty different defi-
nitions of resilience dating back to the early 1970s.2 From this rich liter-
                                                     

 J.D., Lewis and Clark Law School (1997); M.C.P., Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, B.S., Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo. Jeff Litwak is in-house counsel for the Columbia 
River Gorge Commission, an interstate compact agency in White Salmon, Washington, and 
an Adjunct Professor of Law at Lewis and Clark Law School where he teaches interstate 
compact law and land use law. 
 1. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON INCREASING NATIONAL RESILIENCE TO HAZARDS AND 
DISASTERS,  COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND PUBLIC POLICY, POLICY AND GLOBAL 
AFFAIRS,  THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, Disaster Resilience: A National Imperative (Nat’l Acad. 
Press 2012); LARSEN L. RAJKOVICH ET AL., GREEN BUILDING AND CLIMATE RESILIENCE: 
UNDERSTANDING IMPACTS AND PREPARING FOR CHANGING CONDITIONS (2011); ABHAS K. JHA 
ET AL., BUILDING URBAN RESILIENCE: PRINCIPLES, TOOLS, AND PRACTICE (     . 
 2. CMTY. & REG’L RESILIENCE INST., DEFINITIONS OF COMMUNITY RESILIENCE: AN 
ANALYSIS 2–9 (2013). 
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ature, terms such as “ecosystem resiliency,”3 “social resiliency,”4 “system 
resilience,”5 and “economic resilience”6 have become commonplace. 
These and other resilience terms typically present varying themes of 
reducing risk of various shocks or disasters; reducing effects of climate 
change; or the need to build, strengthen, and enhance capacity to rapid-
ly and readily recover from disaster. 
Also from this literature, we know that resilience is an interdisci-
plinary issue involving fields such as engineering,7 energy delivery,8 
emergency services,9 food and water security,10 and law enforcement 
and domestic security.11 Creating resilient communities also “requires 
combinations of apparent opposites, including redundancy and efficien-
cy, diversity and interdependence, strength and flexibility, autonomy 
and collaboration, and planning and adaptability.”12 Resilience litera-
ture is, however, comparatively slim on discussing the most basic under-
lying premise: that communities already have some base level of ser-
vices and infrastructure, or rather, communities have something to 
make resilient. 
Small towns with low tax bases have difficulty providing services 
and infrastructure for day-to-day use.13 Without functional services and 
infrastructure, these towns obviously cannot provide those services or 
use that infrastructure during emergencies. Such small towns, like 
                                                     
 3. A. Bryan Endres & Jody M. Endres, Homeland Security Planning: What 
Victory Gardens and Fidel Castro Can Teach Us in Preparing for Food Crises in the United 
States, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 405, 4 9 (   9  (“ecosystem resiliency” describes “buffering 
capacity (i.e., the ability to absorb shocks without structural change .” . 
 4. Id. (“social resiliency” describes the ability of “communities to withstand 
external shocks to their social infrastructure.” . 
 5. Patrice H. Kunesh, Constant Governments: Tribal Resilience and Regeneration 
in Changing Times, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 8,    (   9  (“system resilience” describes the 
“capacity of a system to tolerate change, to persist, and to adapt in an unpredictable and 
variable environment.” . 
 6. See, e.g., Edward Hill et al., Economic Shocks and Regional Economic 
Resilience 1 (MacArthur Found. Research Network on Bldg. Resilient Regions, Working 
Paper 2011-03, 2011). 
 7. See, e.g., THOMAS FISHER, DESIGNING TO AVOID DISASTER: THE NATURE OF 
FRACTURE-CRITICAL DESIGN (Routledge 2012). 
 8. RAJKOVICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 22. 
 9. E.g., Portland State University offers a Professional Certificate in Emergency 
Leadership and Community Resilience. See Emergency Leadership & Community 
Resilience, PORTLAND ST. U., http://www.pdx.edu/cps/emergency-leadership-community-
resilience (last visited May 21, 2014). 
 10. E.g., Jeremy Allouche, The Sustainability and Resilience of Global Water and 
Food Systems: Political Analysis of the Interplay Between Security, Resource Scarcity, 
Political Systems and Global Trade, 36 FOOD POL’Y 1, S3–S8 (2011). 
 11. See e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMPLEMENTING 9/11 COMMISSION 
RECOMMENDATIONS: PROGRESS REPORT 2011 30 (2011), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/implementing-9-11-commission-report-progress-2011.pdf. 
 12. David R. Godschalk, Urban Hazard Mitigation: Creating Resilient Cities, 4 
NAT. HAZARDS REV. 136, 139 (2003). 
 13. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 374 n.126 (1990); Ronald Kaiser, A Problem in Search of a Solution, 
67 TEX. B.J. 188, 191 (2004). 
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towns of any size and affluence, frequently turn to intergovernmental 
agreements with neighboring towns or county governments to jointly 
construct and maintain physical infrastructure and jointly purchase or 
share human services14—they are, in resilience terms, “interdependent.” 
But not all towns are equally able to use such agreements. 
The forty-eight contiguous states and the District of Columbia col-
lectively create 109 state border pairs.15 Many towns and areas on these 
borders are isolated intrastate, but have neighbors in adjoining states, 
and thus have few options for joint and cooperative action except with 
towns and areas in the adjacent state.16 To engage these cross-border 
neighbors, these communities must contend with intergovernmental 
cooperation statutes that contain different authorities for cooperative 
arrangements, require additional burdens on cross-border agreements, 
and statutes and regulations that contain differing or conflicting re-
quirements for services and infrastructure.17 These additional complexi-
ties of creating interstate, intergovernmental agreements across state 
borders, that is, creating interdependence, may reduce the number of 
such agreements and thus the resiliency of border areas. 
Section II of this article briefly discusses how multi-governmental 
action (interdependence) provides efficient and stable urban services 
and infrastructure and is thus a necessary component of resiliency. Sec-
tion III describes the range of authority for interstate intergovernmen-
tal cooperation. Section IV discusses two common fundamental differ-
ences between the states’ statutes authorizing intergovernmental 
agreements across state lines that complicate such agreements. Finally, 
section V provides two examples of joint, shared, and coordinated action 
in relatively remote Oregon-Washington border communities despite 
those fundamental problems. I use this border in part because it is my 
home territory and in part because comparing two states is more man-
ageable than discussing all 109 permutations of interstate intergovern-
mental agreements; but more importantly because Oregon and Wash-
ington’s statutes are quite different and thus illustrate18 the complex 




                                                     
 14. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 13, at 378; Laurie Reynolds, Intergovernmental 
Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity, and the New Regionalism, 78 WASH. L. REV. 93, 99 (2003). 
 15. This includes the Four Corners states as sharing a border with the states they 
oppose. See Thomas J. Holmes, The Effect of State Policies on the Location of 
Manufacturing: Evidence from State Borders, 106 J. POL. ECON. 667, 697 (1998). 
 16. See, e.g., infra Part V.A. 
 17. See, e.g., infra Part V.A. 
 18. I use the term “illustrate” purposefully. I do not suggest that the differences 
between Oregon and Washington’s statutes are representative of all of the   9 permutations 
of the states’ intergovernmental agreement statutes. 
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II. INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS ARE A NECESSARY 
COMPONENT OF RESILIENCY. 
Multi-jurisdictional agreements for emergency response and aid at 
all levels of government are a common tool for creating resilient com-
munities. A number of interstate compacts focus specifically on cross-
border responses. The most comprehensive of the lot is the Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) between all fifty states, the 
District of Columbia, and three territories, which allows cross-border 
assistance when there is a governor-declared state of emergency.19 Oth-
er interstate emergency response compacts specifically involve civil de-
fense, forest fire suppression, earthquake assistance, and deployment of 
the National Guard.20 Nearly all of the states bordering Canada and 
Canadian provinces bordering the United States have emergency assis-
tance agreements with each other for firefighting,21 and many have 
agreements for other emergency assistance.22 Governments at all levels 
commonly have intergovernmental agreements with other governments 
to provide emergency response,23 frequently pursuant to specific statu-
tory authorization for mutual aid.24 
However, in addition to reducing risk of disaster and increasing ca-
pacity to recover from disaster, resiliency should also be measured by a 
community’s ability to provide basic services and infrastructure prior to 
                                                     
 19. Emergency Management Assistance Compact, (congressional consent given at 
Pub. L. No. 104-321, 110 Stat. 3877 (1996)).  
 20. There are more than a dozen such compacts. The National Center for Interstate 
Compacts at the Council of State Governments maintains a searchable database of nearly all 
interstate compacts. Compact Name Search, NAT’L CTR. FOR INTERSTATE COMPACTS, 
http://apps.csg.org/ncic/ (last visited May 21, 2014). 
 21. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY & PUBLIC SAFETY CANADA, 
COMPENDIUM OF U.S. - CANADA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE MECHANISMS (2012), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/policy/btb-compendium-of-us-canada-
emergency-management-assistance-mechanisms.pdf; International Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact (Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and 
Connecticut and the Provinces of Québec, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova 
Scotia and Newfoundland) (congressional consent given by Pub. L. No. 110-171, 121 Stat. 
2467 (2007)); State and Province Emergency Management Assistance Compact (Illinois, 
Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, New York, and 
Wisconsin, and the Canadian Provinces of Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, and Saskatchewan), 
congressional consent given by Pub. L. 112-282, 126 Stat. 2486 (2013)).  
 22. See, e.g., Michael C. McDaniel, Beyond ‘Beyond the Border’: A Proposal for 
Implementation of the Action Plan’s Recommendation on Cross-Border Critical 
Infrastructure, 37 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 433, 435 (2012). 
 23. See, e.g., Mutual Aid Agreement Between Wasco, Hood River and Sherman Fire 
Defense Districts and Klickitat and Skamania County Fire Protection Agencies, Final Draft 
6-14-13 (on file with author); U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, MASTER COOPERATIVE FIRE 
PROTECTION AGREEMENT 2012, NORTHWEST OPERATING PLAN, OREGON STATEWIDE 
OPERATING PLAN, WASHINGTON STATEWIDE OPERATING PLAN (May 16, 2012) (involving three 
federal agencies and two state agencies, and discussing mobilization of local fire service) (on 
file with author). 
 24. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 38.52.091 (West, Westlaw current with 2014 
Legis. effective through March 31, 2014). 
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any shock, disaster, or change. In the same way that emergency assis-
tance agreements stabilize communities in times of crises, non-
emergency intergovernmental agreements stabilize communities by en-
abling them to maintain or expand their services and infrastructure so 
that communities have services to provide or share through mutual aid 
in times of emergencies. These agreements are not written for the pur-
pose of creating resiliency, but they are important (and sometimes nec-
essary) tools for creating resilient communities. 
For example, redundancy, an indicator of resilience,25 may be im-
possible for small towns to achieve acting alone. Towns that can afford 
only two or three maintenance workers have no redundancy because 
most tasks require a crew of two or more to complete repair and 
maintenance tasks and ensure worker safety. One crew may be able to 
handle most maintenance tasks most of the time, but those workers 
cannot take vacations, cannot stay home sick, or cannot respond to two 
events. However, neighboring towns, each with two or three workers, 
can create two or three shared crews.26 Intergovernmental agreements 
formalize natural interdependencies by allowing communities to right 
size their operations in ways that communities could not accomplish 
acting alone. Indeed, this is the stated purpose of several states’ inter-
governmental cooperation statutes. For example, the declaration of pur-
pose in Washington State’s Interlocal Cooperation Act states, 
It is the purpose of this chapter to permit local governmental 
units to make the most efficient use of their powers by enabling 
them to cooperate with other localities on a basis of mutual ad-
vantage and thereby to provide services and facilities in a man-
ner and pursuant to forms of governmental organization that 
will accord best with geographic, economic, population and other 
factors influencing the needs and development of local communi-
ties.27 
Partnerships between governments, universities, businesses, non-
governmental organizations, and foundations are common themes in 
resilience analyses.28 Intergovernmental agreements are one such part-
nership. However, other than mutual aid agreements, they unfortunate-
ly get little attention in resilience literature. 
                                                     
 25. Godschalk, supra note 12, at 139; see also JOHN D. MOTEFF & CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE: THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY AND PROGRAMS 
AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 5 (2012) (defining redundant as: “[A] number of functionally 
different components so that the entire system does not fail when one component fails.” . 
 26. Interview with Don Stevens, Mayor, North Bonneville., in White Salmon, Wash. 
(Nov. 5, 2013). Mayor Stevens uses this for an example when giving public talks about the 
“Three Cities Initiative” discussed in Section V, below.  
 27. WASH. REV. CODE § 39.34.010 (West, Westlaw current with 2014 Legis. effective 
through March 31, 2014). 
 28. See, e.g., Hill et al., supra note 6, at 57–58. 
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III. STATE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY AUTHORITY FOR 
INTERSTATE INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS.29 
All states authorize intergovernmental agreements in one or more 
ways. First, nearly all states have a statute that broadly authorizes in-
tergovernmental agreements, using terms such as interlocal coopera-
tion, intergovernmental agreements, joint exercise of powers, or no par-
ticular term.30 These generally applicable statutes also contain require-
                                                     
 29. Although much of this article focuses on Oregon and Washington, there is little 
law concerning authority for, or use of, intergovernmental agreements in any one state. 
Therefore, general principles of law discussed in this section cite sources nationally. 
 30. ALA. CODE § 11-102-1 (West, Westlaw current through Act 2014-68 of the 2014 
Regular Session); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-952 (West, Westlaw current through the First 
Regular and First Special Sessions of the Fifty-first Legislature); ARK. CODE ANN. 25-20-101 
(West, Westlaw current through end of 2013 Regular and First Ex. Sessions, including 
changes made by Ark. Code Rev. Comm. received through 1/1/2014, and emerg. eff. Acts from 
2014 Fiscal Sess.); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6500 (West, Westlaw current with urgency legislation 
through Ch. 9 of 2014 Reg. Sess. and all propositions on the 6/3/2014 ballot); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 29-1-203 (West, Westlaw current with Chapters 1-3 and 5-7 of the Second 
Regular Session of the 69th General Assembly); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-339a (West, 
Westlaw current through the 2014 Supplement to the General Statutes of Connecticut, 
Revision of 1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.01 (West, Westlaw current with Chapters in effect 
from the 2014 2nd Reg. Sess. of the 23rd Legislature through March 31, 2014); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 36-69A-1 (West, Westlaw current through Act 351 of the 2014 Reg. Sess.); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. §§ 67-2326 to 2333 (2006); 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 220 § 1 (West, Westlaw current 
through P.A. 98-627 of the 2014 Reg. Sess.); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-1-7-1 (West, Westlaw 
current through P.L. 29 of the Second Reg. Sess. of the 118th General Assembly with effective 
dates through March 13, 2014); IOWA CODE ANN. § 28E.1 (West, Westlaw current with 
immediately eff. Legis. signed as of 4/4/2014 from the 2014 Reg. Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-
2901 (West, Westlaw current through 2013 Reg. and Spec. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
65.210 (West, Westlaw current through the end of the 2013 Reg. Sess. and the 2013 
extraordinary session); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:1324 (West, Westlaw current through the 
2013 Reg. Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 30-A, § 2203 (West, Westlaw current with 
emergency Legis. through Chapter 492 of the 2013 Second Reg. Sess. of the 126th Leg.); MD. 
CODE ANN. LOCAL GOV’T § 1-901 (West, Westlaw current through chapter 1 of the 2014 Reg. 
Sess. of the General Assembly); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 40, § 4A (West, Westlaw current 
through Chapter 61 of the 2014 2nd Annual Session); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 124.502 
(West, Westlaw current through P.A.2014, No. 63, of the Reg. Sess., 97th Legislature); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 471.59 (West, Westlaw current through Chapter 147 of the 2014 Reg. Sess.); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-13-1 (West, Westlaw current through end of 2013 Reg. Sess. and 1st & 
2nd Ex. Sess.); MO. ANN. STAT. § 70.220 (West, Westlaw current with emergency legis. 
approved through Feb. 19, 2014, of the 2014 Second Reg. Sess. of the 97th General 
Assembly); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-11-101 (West, Westlaw current through the 2013 Session, 
and the 2012 general election); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-801 (West, Westlaw current 
through End of 2013 Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 277.080 (West, Westlaw current 
through the 2013 77th Reg. Sess. and the 27th Spec. Sess. of the Nevada Leg.); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 53-A:3 (Current through Chapter 2 of the 2014 Reg. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
40A:65-1 (West, Westlaw current with laws effective through L.2014, J.R. No. 1); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 11-1-1 (West, Westlaw current through all 2013 legislation, and including Ch. 6, 11, 
24, 25, 28, 31, 32, 37, 40, 58, 70, 71, 79-81, of the Second Reg. Sess. of the 51st Legislature 
(2014)); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 119-o (McKinney current through L.2014, chapters 1 to 17); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 160A-460 (West, Westlaw current through the end of the 2013 Reg. 
Sess. of the General Assembly); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 54-40-01 (West, Westlaw current 
through the 2013 Reg. Sess. of the 63rd Legis. Assembly); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 715.02, 
307.15 (West, Westlaw current through Files 1 to 76, and 78 of the 130th; OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
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ments for, and restrictions on use of, intergovernmental agreements.31 
Most of these general statutes have their roots in two past efforts to 
promote scholarship and use of intergovernmental agreements. First, in 
1956, the Council of Governments32 drafted a suggested “Interlocal Co-
operation Act.”33 Second, in 1967, the U.S. Advisory Commission on In-
tergovernmental Relations34 made some revisions to the Council of State 
Governments’ suggested act and adopted its own suggested legisla-
                                                                                                                           
TIT. 74, § 1001 (West, Westlaw current through Chapter 23 (End) of the First Extraordinary 
Sess. of the 54th Leg.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 190.003 (West, Westlaw current with 
emergency legis. through Ch. 80 of the 2014 Reg. Sess.); 53 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2301–2317 
(West, Westlaw current through Reg. Sess. Act 2014-21); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-40.1–2 
(West, Westlaw current with amendments through chapter 534 of the 2013 Reg. Sess.); S.C. 
CODE ANN. §§ 5-7-60, 6-1-20 (current through end of 2013 Reg. Sess.)); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§§ 6-17-1 to 6-17-15 (Current through the 2013 Reg. Sess. and Supreme Court Rule 13-17); 
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 12-9-101, 5-1-113, 5-1-114 (West, Westlaw current with laws from the 
2014 Second Reg. Sess., eff. through Feb. 28, 2014); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 791.002 (West, 
Westlaw current through the end of the 2013 Third Called Sess. of the 83rd Leg.); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 11-13-101 (West, Westlaw current through 2013 Second Spec. Sess.); VT. STAT. 
ANN. TIT. 24, § 4901 (West, Westlaw current through the laws of the First Sess. of the 2013-
2014 Vermont General Assembly); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1300 (West, Westlaw current 
through End of the 2013 Reg. Sess. and the End of 2013 Sp. S. I and includes 2014 Reg. Sess. 
cc. 1, 2 and 8); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 39.34.010 (West, Westlaw current with 2014 Legis. 
effective through March 31, 2014); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-23-3 (West, Westlaw current with 
laws of the 2014 Reg. Sess. S.B. 444); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0301 (West, Westlaw current 
through 2013 Act 146, published 3/28/2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-1-101 (West, Westlaw 
current through the 2013 General Sess.). Alaska, Delaware, the District of Columbia, and 
Hawaii do not have general intergovernmental agreement statutes. 
 31. E.g., ALA. CODE § 11-102-2 (West, Westlaw through Act 2014-191 of 2014 Reg. 
Sess. 2014) (restricting joint powers contracts to three-year terms); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
163.01(7)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2014 2nd Reg. Sess.) (prohibiting a separate legal 
intergovernmental entity from levying any type of tax or issue bonds in its own name). 
 32. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-186 (West, Westlaw current through 2013 Reg. 
Sess.). The Council of State Governments (CSG) is a research and policy organization serving 
state governments. About CSG Regional Offices, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, 
http://www.csg.org/about/default.aspx (last visited May 21, 2014). All fifty states are 
members. Id. 
 33. COMM. OF STATE OFFICIALS ON SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, THE COUNCIL 
OF STATE GOV’TS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION PROGRAM FOR 1957 93–97 (1956) 
[hereinafter COMM. OF STATE OFFICIALS]. 
 34. The United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
(ACIR), a research agency similar to the Administrative Conference of the United States, 
existed between 1959 and 1996. Pub. L. No. 86-380, 73 Stat. 703 (1959), created ACIR. The 
Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-52, 109 Stat. 468, 480 (1995), terminated ACIR. The ACIR statutes remain in the U.S. 
Code. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4271–4279 (2012) (42 U.S.C.A. ch. 53 Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations). For a recent symposium on the history, accomplishments, and 
vision for a reconstituted Advisory Commission, see John Kincaid & Carl W. Stenberg, 
Introduction to the Symposium on Intergovernmental Management and ACIR Beyond 50: 
Implications for Institutional Development Research, 71 PUB. ADMIN. REV.158 (2011) and 
other symposium articles. 
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tion.”35 Many of the states’ generally applicable intergovernmental 
agreement statutes still contain elements of these suggested acts. 
This article focuses on these general statutes; however, there are 
other sources of authority. All states, including those without a general 
statute, have statutes that reference, authorize, or mandate require-
ments for intergovernmental agreements for specific purposes.36 Differ-
ent types of municipalities may also be subject to different statutory and 
regulatory requirements for providing the same service.37 One quarter of 
the states also have provisions in their constitutions that authorize in-
tergovernmental cooperation.38 Finally, common law may be another 
source of authority. For example, some courts have upheld intergovern-
mental agreements pursuant to a municipality’s general contracting 
authority or other pre-existing authority, even where the agreement 
would not be permissible under statutory authority for intergovernmen-
tal agreements.39 
Most generally applicable intergovernmental agreement statutes 
expressly authorize agreements that cross state borders. The Council of 
                                                     
 35. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, A HANDBOOK FOR 
INTERLOCAL AGREEMENTS AND CONTRACTS 24–28 (1967), available at 
http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/Reports/information/m-29.pdf [hereinafter ADVISORY 
COMM’N]. 
 36. For example, more than 200 distinct statutory sections in Arizona refer to or 
authorize intergovernmental agreements for a specific purpose. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 11-952, 9-461.11, 15-1470, 36-2925 (2013). See also McNeill v. Harnett County, 398 
S.E.2d 475, 479 (N.C. 1990) (affirming charges pursuant to intergovernmental agreement 
authorized by statutes specifically allowing agreements between counties and water and 
sewer districts). 
 37. See, e.g., Durango v. Durango Transp., Inc., 807 P.2d 1152 (Colo. 1991) 
(reversing a court of appeals decision concluding that a city could provide mass transit free 
from the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission, but a county was subject to PUC 
jurisdiction).  
 38. ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 13 (West, Westlaw through the legislation effective 
March 26, 2014, passed during the 2014 2nd Reg. Sess. of the 28th Legislature); COLO. 
CONST. art. XIV, § 18 (West, Westlaw current with amendments adopted through the Nov. 5, 
2013 General Election); FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (West, Westlaw current through Nov. 6, 
2012, General Election); GA. CONST. art. IX, § III ¶ I(A) (West, Westlaw current through Act 
351 of the 2014 Reg. Sess.); HAW. CONST. art. XVI, § 5; (West, Westlaw current with 
amendments through Act 4 [End] of the 2013 2nd Special Sess.); ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 10 
(West, Westlaw through 4/1/2014); LA. CONST. art. VI, § 20 (West, Westlaw current through 
the 2013 Reg. Sess.); MICH. CONST. art III, § 5; MO. CONST. art. VI, § 16 (West, Westlaw 
current through emergency legis. approved February 19, 2014, of the 2014 Second Reg. Sess. 
of the 97th General Assembly); MONT. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (West, Westlaw current through 
the 2012 general election); NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 18 (West, Westlaw current through the 
End of 2013 Reg. Sess.); N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1(C) (West, Westlaw current through L.2014, 
chapters 1 to 17); PA. CONST. art. IX, § 5 (West, Westlaw current through Reg. Sess. Act 
2014-21); S.C. CONST. art. VII, § 13; S.D. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (West, Westlaw current through 
the 2013 Reg. Sess. and Supreme Court Rule 13-17). 
 39. See, e.g., Utah Cnty v. Ivie, 137 P.3d 797 (Utah 2006) (holding that the county 
and city had independent authority to undertake actions in an agreement for the county to 
condemn property for a road and for the city to pay the expenses of condemnation, 
installation, and maintenance of the road, thus the agreement was valid even though the 
intergovernmental cooperation act did not authorize agreement). 
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State Governments explained that it drafted the 1957 suggested act 
with the intent that it could be used “between or among communities 
whether or not they are located within a single state.”40 Most general 
statutes require the attorney general or another state official to review 
and approve (or not object to) cross-border agreements. For example, in 
Oregon, the attorney general must approve agreements in which Oregon 
public agencies seek to enter into with public agencies of other states.41 
In Washington, the state official with constitutional or statutory author-
ity, or jurisdiction over providing the service or facility that is the sub-
ject of the cross-border agreement, must approve the agreement.42 
Despite this apparent authority for interstate intergovernmental 
agreements, there are two reasons these generally applicable intergov-
ernmental cooperation statutes are not optimal for encouraging inter-
state intergovernmental agreements. The first reason is that specific 
provisions in many of the states’ intergovernmental cooperation statutes 
may have the effect of prohibiting or discouraging interstate intergov-
ernmental agreements. This article focuses on two of the fundamental, 
and perhaps the most potentially disabling, provisions: declaring an in-
terstate intergovernmental agreement to be an interstate compact and 
the differing powers required of each party to enter into an intergov-
ernmental agreement. I purposefully say, “potentially disabling.” There 
are many interstate intergovernmental agreements; most ignore the 
compact question. There are no reported cases in any state challenging 
the validity of an interstate intergovernmental agreement based on a 
compact provision, and few cases address the powers question. Never-
theless, the possibility for challenge remains. The second reason is that 
intergovernmental cooperation statutes do not abrogate any of the re-
quirements and restrictions in the states’ substantive authorities, so 
interstate intergovernmental agreements may be subject to two (or 
more) sets of legislative and regulatory standards. Communities that 
wish to engage intergovernmental arrangements where the states’ stat-
utes conflict or lack reciprocal authority must plan for time and expense 
to craft complex workarounds. 
IV. BARRIERS TO INTERSTATE INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
AGREEMENTS. 
A. Interstate Intergovernmental Agreements as Interstate Compacts 
Eleven states have intergovernmental cooperation statutes that 
contain a provision declaring agreements between a public entity 
(broadly defined to include the full suite of local and state government) 
                                                     
 40. COMM. OF STATE OFFICIALS, supra note 33, at 94. 
 41. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 190.420 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 80 2014 Reg. Sess.).  
 42. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 39.34.050 (West, Westlaw current with 2014 Legis. 
effective through March 31, 2014). 
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in that state and an agency in another state to, “have the status of an 
interstate compact.”43 This compact provision originated in the Council 
of State Governments’  957 suggested Interlocal Cooperation Act,44 and 
the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations preserved it 
in its 1967 suggested legislation.45 Neither suggested act explained the 
need for this provision. The Council of State Governments simply noted, 
“It is clear that [relationships with neighboring subdivisions on the oth-
er side of the state boundary] are possible when cast in the form of in-
terstate compacts.”46 Similarly, the Advisory Commission stated, “Nor-
mally, intergovernmental contracts or agreements which are interstate 
need only be authorized by statute in both of the States and, if neces-
sary, by constitutional provision.”47 
Embedded in both suggested acts is a legal presumption, which I 
believe is incorrect, that an interstate intergovernmental agreement is 
the equivalent to an interstate compact. An interstate compact is an 
agreement between states as states, that is, an agreement between the 
sovereigns.48 One hallmark (although not a universal rule) of an inter-
state compact is that each party state’s legislature enacts the compact,49 
followed by the necessary governor’s action. Alternatively, the text of a 
legislatively enacted compact may authorize administrative officials to 
join that specific compact.50 In either situation, a compact is between the 
                                                     
 43. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-20-105 (West, Westlaw current through end of 2013 Reg. 
and First Ex. Sess., including changes made by Ark. Code Rev. Comm. received through 
1/1/2014, and emerg. eff. acts from 2014 Fiscal Sess.: 210); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-1-7-8 (West, 
Westlaw current through 2014 Second Reg. Sess. of the 118th General Assembly); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 28E.9 (West, Westlaw current with legis. from the 2014 Reg. Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 12-2905 (West, Westlaw current through 2013 Reg. and special Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 65.290 (West, Westlaw current through the end of the 2013 Reg. Sess. and the 2013 
extraordinary session); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 277.160 (West, Westlaw current through the 
2013 77th Reg. Sess. and the 27th Spec. Sess. of the Nevada Leg.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 
1005 (West, Westlaw current through Chapter 23 (End) of the First Extraordinary Sess. of 
the 54th Legislature (2013)); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-40.1-5 (West, Westlaw current with 
amendments through chapter 534 of the 2013 Reg. Sess.); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 12-9-105 
(West, Westlaw current through Feb. 28, 2014 of the 2014 Second Reg. Sess.); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 39.34.040 (West, Westlaw current with 2014 Legis. effective through March 31, 
2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0303(4) (West, Westlaw current through 2013 Act 146, published 
3/28/2014). 
 44. COMM. OF STATE OFFICIALS, supra note 33, at 93 (suggested act at § 5).  
 45. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 35, at 27  (suggested act at § 5). 
 46. COMM. OF STATE OFFICIALS, supra note 33, at 94  (suggested act at § 7). 
 47. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 35, at 27–28  (suggested act at § 7). 
 48. See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 42 (1994  (“An 
interstate compact, by its very nature, shifts a part of a state’s authority to another state or 
states, or to the agency the several states jointly create to run the compact.”  (quoting 
MARIAN E. RIDGEWAY, INTERSTATE COMPACTS: A QUESTION OF FEDERALISM 300 (1971). 
 49. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Dep’t of Transp., 7 8 A. d 48  (Pa.  998  (where compact 
text requires states enact the compact into law, a statute authorizing the state secretary of 
transportation to enter into the compact was not an effective enactment). 
 50. See, e.g., Interstate Library Compact, NCIC, 
http://apps.csg.org/ncic/Compact.aspx?id=89 (last visited May 21, 2014). 
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states as states.51 In contrast, legislatures do not enact, ratify, or review 
interstate intergovernmental agreements. In the states where review of 
such agreements is required, it is the attorney general or another state 
official that does so.52 For this reason alone, a state’s broadly applicable 
intergovernmental cooperation statute cannot, by operation of law, ele-
vate an intergovernmental agreement (i.e., an agreement between sub-
divisions of the states) or in some cases, home rule entities, to the status 
of an agreement between states as states. 
Another legal problem with this compact provision exists when only 
one of the states has a compact provision in its intergovernmental coop-
eration statutes. The eleven states with a compact provision make up 
forty-five state borders, only six of which are between states where both 
states have a compact provision.53 Three of the states with a compact 
provision do not share any border with a state that has a compact provi-
sion.54 
Even assuming that an intergovernmental agreement statute can, 
as a matter of law, elevate an agreement to the status of an interstate 
compact, an interstate compact cannot exist unless all of the party 
states intend to create a compact.55 That mutuality does not exist unless 
all party states have declared an interstate intergovernmental agree-
ment to be an interstate compact. That mutuality does not exist on thir-
ty-nine of the forty-five borders of the states with compact provisions. 
Additionally, nearly all of the states’ intergovernmental agreement 
statutes specify that an interstate intergovernmental agreement must 
meet the other state’s legal requirements.56 Thus the general statutes in 
states without a compact provision would prohibit an agreement be-
cause the agreement could not comply with the compact provision in the 
first state. Neither the Council of State Governments nor the Advisory 
Commission’s suggested acts addressed the lack of mutuality when only 
one state declares an interstate intergovernmental agreement to have 
the status of an interstate compact.57 
                                                     
 51. For more on interstate compacts generally, see CAROLINE N. BROUN ET AL., THE 
EVOLVING USE AND CHANGING ROLE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS, A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 
(ABA Publ’g    6 ; JEFFREY B. LITWAK, INTERSTATE COMPACT LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 
(2012); JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE COOPERATION: COMPACTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
AGREEMENTS (2d ed. 2012). 
 52. See supra text accompanying notes 44. 
 53. The borders where both states have a compact provision are Arkansas-
Tennessee, Arkansas-Oklahoma, Indiana-Kentucky, Iowa-Wisconsin, Kansas-Oklahoma, 
and Kentucky-Tennessee.  
 54. Id. The states with a compact provision that do not border any state that also 
has a compact provision are Nevada, Washington, and Rhode Island.  
 55. BROUN ET AL., supra note 51, at 21 (describing compacting process as offer, 
acceptance and consideration). 
 56. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 190.420(1) (West, Westlaw current with emergency 
legis. through Ch. 80 of the 2014 Reg. Sess.). 
 57. COMM. OF STATE OFFICIALS, supra note 33, at 93–97; ADVISORY COMM’N, supra 
note 35, at 24–28. 
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The compact provision also raises political concerns. Since the 
1950s and 1960s, the law of interstate compacts has evolved such that 
the Council of State Governments and the Advisory Commission proba-
bly did not anticipate the complexities of declaring an interstate inter-
governmental agreement to be an interstate compact. One such com-
plexity is the U.S. Constitution’s requirement for congressional consent 
for interstate compacts.58 Although the text of the Constitution specifies 
the requirement for consent without restriction, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has interpreted the compact clause to require consent in two situations: 
(1) when the compact enhances the power of the states to the detriment 
of federal supremacy,59 or (2) when the compact enhances the power of 
the compacting states to the detriment of non-compacting states.60 
There is ample room for debate and litigation over whether consent is 
actually required.61 The Council of State Governments and the Advisory 
Commission dismissed this concern by asserting that interstate inter-
governmental agreements “lie squarely within State jurisdiction and 
therefore raise no question of the balance of the federal system.”62 This 
statement was probably too broad back in the 1950s and 1960s because 
consent is dependent on the subject matter of each agreement.63 The 
Council of State Governments and the Advisory Commission may be 
correct most of the time, but at least one interstate intergovernmental 
agreement has received consent.64 This illustrates that parties to an in-
terstate intergovernmental agreement cannot hastily dismiss the possi-
bility of needing congressional consent for their agreement. 
Second, the possibility of congressional consent for interstate inter-
governmental agreements raises another issue, one that neither the 
Council of State Governments nor the Advisory Commission addressed: 
that consent transforms an interstate compact into federal law. Alt-
hough the Supreme Court’s clearest statement to this effect long post-
dated the model acts,65 the underpinnings of the transformation of a 
                                                     
 58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, CL. 3. The compact clause states, “No State shall, 
without the consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another 
State.” Id. 
 59. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 4 4 U.S. 45 , 46  ( 978 . 
 60. Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 
175–76 (1985). 
 61. One example of protracted litigation involves the Multistate Tax Compact. See 
U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 452. There is current debate about whether the National 
Popular Vote bill, an interstate compact, might require consent. See Myths about Interstate 
Compacts and Congressional Intent, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, 
http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/answers/section.php?s=16 (last visited May 21, 
2014). 
 62. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 35, at 7. 
 63. BROUN ET AL., supra note 51, at 37. 
 64. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 166, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. (1996) (“[g]ranting the consent of 
Congress to the A Mutual Aid Agreement between the city of Bristol, Virginia, and the city of 
Bristol, Tennessee.”   
 65. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 4  , 44  ( 98   (stating, “But where Congress has 
authorized the States to enter into a cooperative agreement and the subject matter of that 
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compact into federal law predated the model acts.66 Additionally, in the 
decades since the Council of State Governments and the Advisory Com-
mission published their suggested acts, courts have concluded that com-
pact entities do not enjoy the states’ immunity from suit in federal 
court;67 the compact preempts or supersedes conflicting state law and 
state constitutions under federalism and contract principles;68 compacts 
have equal footing as congressionally enacted federal statutes in a con-
flict-of-laws analysis;69 courts apply federal law standards when con-
                                                                                                                           
agreement is an appropriate subject for congressional legislation, Congress’ consent 
transforms the States’ agreement into federal law under the Compact Clause.” . 
 66. Id. at 438 n.7 (citing Del. River Joint Toll Bridge Comm’n. v. Colburn, 310 U.S. 
419, 427  (1940)). 
 67. See, e.g., Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 56 (1994) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting  (Justice O’Connor lamented, “Despite several invitations, this 
Court has not as yet had occasion to find an interstate entity shielded by the Eleventh 
Amendment from suit in federal court.” . 
 68. See, e.g., Seattle Master Builders Ass’n v. Pac. Nw. Electric Power & Cons. 
Planning Council, 786 F. d   59,   7  ( 986  (stating, “A state can impose state law on a 
compact organization only if the compact specifically reserves its right to do so.” ; Wash. 
Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land in Montgomery Cnty., Md., 706 F.2d 1312, 
1318–19 (4th Cir. 1983) (Maryland may confer on an interstate agency federal quick-take 
condemnation powers that are not available to state agencies under Maryland’s 
Constitution); Stephans v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 697 F. Supp. 1149, 1152 (D. Nev. 
1988) (the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency’s regional plan preempts state law and state 
constitutional provisions, and dismissed a takings claim based on the Nevada Constitution); 
Alcorn v. Wolfe, 827 F. Supp. 47, 53 (D.D.C. 1993) (Metropolitan Washington Airports 
Authority’s compact provision specifying that appointments to the authority are made for a 
specific term superseded the Virginia Constitution under which political appointees are 
removable-at-will); Alamosa-La Jara Water Users Prot. Ass’n v. Gould, 674 P. d 9 4, 9  –23 
(Colo. 1984) (state constitutional and statutory laws apply only to water that has not been 
committed to other states by an interstate compact or a United States Supreme Court 
decree); Frontier Ditch Co. v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 761 P.2d 1117, 1124 (Colo. 
1998  (concluding, “Thus, to the extent that there might be some arguable conflict between 
[the compact’s] Article VI B’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to Kansas and the Colorado 
water court’s jurisdiction [granted in that state’s constitution], Article VI B is the supreme 
law of the land and governs the rights of the parties in this case.” . 
 69. See, e.g., NYSA–ILA Vacation & Holiday Fund v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. 
Harbor, 732 F.2d 292, 298 (2d Cir. 1984) (compact that had received congressional consent 
was not preempted or superseded by federal ERISA statute); Am. Sugar Refining Co. v. 
Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 4   N.E. 2d 578, 586–87 (N.Y. 1982) (holding that since 
a compact provision is “federal law,” conflicts between compact provisions and federal 
statutes cannot be resolved by “preemption” analysis, but by an analysis of whether one 
“impliedly repeals” another ; Lake Tahoe Watercraft Recreation Ass’n v. Tahoe Reg’l 
Planning Agency,  4 F. Supp.  d   6 ,   7  (E.D. Cal.  998  (“To the extent the two federal 
schemes [i.e., the Clean Water Act and the Tahoe Compact] conflict, the Compact should be 
given effect ‘because it is a congressional enactment passed later in time and, is more specific 
than the [Clean Water Act] as it is limited to a very narrow geographical area.’” ; City of S. 
Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 664 F. Supp.   75,   78 (E.D. Cal.  987  (“The 
only common ground of the [Compact and the Airline Deregulation Act] is geographic and 
perhaps incidental but is not substantive. As for this geographic overlap, the Compact is 
clearly more specific and enacted later in time.” . 
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struing a compact;70 and a compact entity’s rules and actions are federal 
law71 or have some federal character.72 Even compacts that do not re-
quire consent have some “supra-state”73 characteristics.74 
Finally, the Council of State Governments and the Advisory Com-
mission observed that declaring an intergovernmental agreement to be 
an interstate compact raises the question whether the states, rather 
than the signatory local government parties, might be liable for actions 
under the agreement.75 The Council of State Governments explained, 
[T]he usual interstate compact is an instrument to which states 
are party. Since the contemplated [intergovernmental] agree-
ments should be the primary creation and responsibility of the 
local communities, the [suggested] act makes them the real par-
ties in interest for legal purposes and places the state more in 
the position of guarantor. Since this means that the obligation is 
enforceable against the state if necessary, the [intergovernmen-
tal] agreement will have all the necessary attributes of a com-
pact. However, the state in turn is protected by the requirement 
of prior approval of the agreement by state authorities and by 
                                                     
 70. See, e.g., N.Y. State Dairy Foods, Inc. v. Ne. Dairy Compact Comm’n,  6 F. 
Supp. 2d 249, 260 (D. Mass. 1998) (applying the federal Chevron method for review of the 
compact agency’s interpretation of its federal consent statute ; Friends of the Columbia 
Gorge v. Columbia River Gorge Comm’n,     P. d   64,   74 (Or.    9  (same . 
 71. See, e.g., Stephans v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 697 F. Supp. 1149, 1152 (D. 
Nev.  988 , (expressly stating that the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency’s regional land use 
plan is federal law); R.I. Fishermen’s Alliance v. R.I. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., 585 F.3d 42, 49 
(1st Cir. 2009) (satisfying the well-pleaded complaint requirement because the Atlantic 
States Marine Fisheries Commission management plan is federal law). 
 72. See, e.g., League to Save Lake Tahoe v. B.J.K. Corp., 547 F.2d 1072, 1073 (9th 
Cir.  976  (stating, “Questions arising under the TRPA Land Use Ordinance enacted 
pursuant to the Compact do not automatically give rise to Section 1331(a) jurisdiction, 
because the Compact is not an ordinary federal statute and the Ordinance is not directly 
analogous to the Code of Federal Regulations. Interstate compacts occupy a unique position 
in our federal system.” ; Friends of the Columbia Gorge, Inc. v. Columbia River Gorge 
Comm’n., 171 P.3d 942, 969–70 (Or. Ct. App. 2007), aff’d in relevant part, 213 P.3d 1164, 
1189 (Or. 2009) (applying federal deferential review under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 
( 997 , to the Columbia River Gorge Commission’s interpretation of its own regulations ; 
Klickitat Cnty. v. State of Wash., 86  P. d 6 9, 6 4 (Wash. Ct. App.  99   (stating, “The 
[Columbia River Gorge] Commission’s land management plan and the [federal] act’s 
provisions relative to the plan are federally mandated, and do not constitute a state 
program.” . 
 73. For a description of an interstate compact as “supra-state, sub federal,” see 
BROUN ET AL., supra note 51, at 1. 
 74. See, e.g., Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1, 89 (1823). In this case, the first compact 
case at the U.S. Supreme Court, Kentucky had enacted laws that conflicted with its compact 
with Virginia. Using a contracts analysis and without any reference to consent, the Court 
questioned, “Can the government of Kentucky fly from this agreement, acceded to by the 
people in their sovereign capacity, because it involves a principle which might be 
inconvenient, or even pernicious to the State, in some other respect? The Court cannot 
perceive how this proposition could be maintained.” The Court also concluded that 
Kentucky’s enactments violated the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 92–93. 
 75. COMM. OF STATE OFFICIALS, supra note 33, at 94. 
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the provisions of Section 5 preserving the state’s right of re-
course against a non-performing locality.76 
The Advisory Commission adopted this explanation almost verba-
tim.77 To address this concern, section 5 of both suggested acts specifies 
that the parties to the agreement are the “real parties in interest and 
[that] the state may maintain an action to recoup or otherwise make 
itself whole for . . . damages or liability [that] it may incur by reason of 
being joined.”78 All of the states that still have a compact provision con-
tain this liability provision.79 
A question to ponder is whether a state official would be willing to 
approve an interstate intergovernmental agreement if he or she under-
stood that approving the agreement would raise the following issues: 1) 
whether the agreement is actually an interstate compact, 2) whether the 
agreement requires congressional consent,    the potential “supra-state” 
nature of the agreement, 4) approving the agreement might open the 
state to liability, and 5) the possibility of litigation to recoup damages or 
liability the state might incur in an action involving the agreement.80 
A compact provision is unnecessary to create effective and binding 
interstate intergovernmental agreements. More importantly, a compact 
provision is a legal barrier to interstate intergovernmental cooperation 
along most of the borders of the states that have such a provision. And 
on the remaining borders, the parties may not want to invoke the estab-
lished principles of compact law for their agreement. For these reasons, 
a compact provision may discourage interstate intergovernmental coop-
eration; the states that have a compact provision should simply repeal 
that provision. 
                                                     
 76. Id. 
 77. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 35, at 25. 
 78. Id. at 27 (suggested act at § 5); COMM. OF STATE OFFICIALS, supra note 33, at 96 
(suggested act at § 5). 
 79. ARK. CODE ANN. §25-20-105(b)(1)−(2) (West, Westlaw through Reg. and First 
Ex. Sess. 2013); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-1-7-8 (West, Westlaw through P.L.29 of Second Reg. 
Sess. 2014); IOWA CODE ANN. § 28E.9 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.) KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 12-2905 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. and Sp. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
65.290 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 277.160 (2013); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 1005 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 23 (End) of First Ex. Sess. Of 
54th Legis. 2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-40.1-5 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 534 of 2013 
Reg. Sess.); TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 12-9-105 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Second Reg. Sess.); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 39.34.040 (West, Westlaw current with 2014 Legis. effective 
through March 31, 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0303(4) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Act. 
146). 
 80. For a description of the paucity of scholarly and political literature and low level 
of familiarity about compact by lawyers, legislators, and others, see BROUN ET AL., supra note 
51, at xvii; LITWAK, supra note 51, at i. 
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B. Powers Needed for an Intergovernmental Agreement 
The compact provision affects interstate intergovernmental agree-
ments in about 40% of the states’ borders;81 however, the issue of au-
thority could affect interstate intergovernmental agreements at all bor-
ders.82 Intergovernmental cooperation statutes follow one of two ap-
proaches for specifying the powers parties must possess to undertake an 
intergovernmental agreement. Like the compact provision, the distinc-
tion between these two approaches has its history in the Council of 
State Governments and Advisory Commission’s suggested acts. The 
Council of State Governments’  957 suggested act authorized municipal-
ities to enter into an agreement if at least one of the parties had such 
power.83 The Advisory Commission’s  967 suggested act modified this 
authority to allow states to elect to use the original 1957 language or 
use language that restricted intergovernmental agreements to situa-
tions where only all municipalities to the agreement independently had 
authority to undertake the action.84 This more restrictive approach does 
not require independent authority to perform the subject activity in 
each of the other contracting municipalities’ jurisdictions; it means 
simply that each municipality has the authority to perform the subject 
activity within its own jurisdiction.85 State intergovernmental coopera-
tion statutes that do not directly descend from the suggested acts or that 
                                                     
 81. See supra text accompanying notes 15. 
 82. This issue could affect all of the state borders because many specific statutory 
authorities for intergovernmental agreements specify the parties’ necessary powers, some of 
which differ from a state’s generally applicable intergovernmental cooperation statute, and 
some of which supersede those general statutes. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 124.503 
(West Westlaw through P.A.2014, No. 36, of the 2014 Reg. Sess.) (generally applicable 
statute specifying that a conflicting specific statute would control); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:17-
24.9 (West, Westlaw 2014 L.2013, c. 284 (End) and J.R. No. 18) (specific statute specifying 
that it would control over generally applicable statute). 
 83. COMM. OF STATE OFFICIALS, supra note 33, at 95 (suggested act at § 4, stating, 
“Any power or powers, privileges or authority exercised or capable of exercise by a public 
agency of this state may be exercised and enjoyed jointly with any other public agency of this 
state . . .” . 
 84. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 35, at  6 (“Any power or powers, privileges or 
authority exercised or capable of exercise by a public agency of this state may be exercised 
and enjoyed jointly with any other public agency of this state [having the power or powers, 
privilege or authority] . . .” . The bracketed text is the optional language that would limit 
municipal powers. 
 85. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.59(1) (West, Westlaw through Reg. Legis. Sess. 
2014  (authorizing agreements where the powers “are the same except for the territorial 
limits within which they may be exercised” ; City of Medina v. Primm,  57 P. d  79,  8  
(Wash.    7  (“[T]he question under RCW 39.34.080 is whether the city is authorized to 
perform the type of governmental activity that is the subject of the agreement.” (emphasis in 
original)); Durango Transp., Inc. v. City of Durango, 824 P.2d 48, 49–53 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) 
(citing several cases in accord); W. Wash. Univ. v. Wash. Fed’n of State Emps., 79  P. d 989, 
99  (Wash. Ct. App.  99   (stating the “[u]niversity’s power to enter into interlocal 
cooperation agreements is expressly subject to the university’s obligations and 
responsibilities under the [State] Higher Education Personnel Law” . 
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were amended so that the suggested act’s language is no longer recog-
nizable typically use language that suggests one of these approaches.86 
Oregon follows the less restrictive approach originally suggested by 
the Council of State Governments, so that all parties to an intergovern-
mental agreement in Oregon may exercise powers in an intergovern-
mental agreement if at least one of the parties has such powers.87 In 
contrast, Washington elected to use the latter, more restrictive ap-
proach.88 Oregon’s approach allows a greater breadth of intergovern-
mental cooperative arrangements. This fundamental difference between 
the Oregon and Washington intergovernmental cooperation statutes 
means that border towns in Oregon that could broadly use intergovern-
mental agreements with other state and local entities in Oregon do not 
have all of the same opportunities to do so with Washington entities. 
What is not clear is the extent that statutes restrict the opportuni-
ties for Oregon communities to enter into agreements with Washington 
communities. The Washington Attorney General’s opinion is that the 
parties to an agreement must have only the general authority in ques-
tion.89 But this opinion does not explain the extent that express differ-
ences in the states’ substantive statutes may prevent performance of 
nominally similar tasks. For example, the law governing Washington’s 
housing authorities contains unit number and interior space percentage 
requirements that Oregon law does not.90 Would an Oregon housing au-
thority thus be unable to perform services in Washington pursuant to an 
agreement with a Washington housing authority? Few court decisions 
have invalidated an intergovernmental agreement for lack of mutual 
powers and there is no consensus about how mutual the parties’ powers 
must be.91 
                                                     
 86. See Laurie Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity, and 
the New Regionalism, 78 WASH. L. REV. 93, 122 (2003) (discussing the difference between the 
states in terms of “the debate between the ‘mutuality of powers’ approach and the ‘power of 
one unit’ approach” . 
 87. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 190.010 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 80 2014 Reg. Sess.). 
 88. WASH. REV. CODE § 39.34.030(5) (West, Westlaw current with 2014 Legis. 
effective through March 31, 2014). 
 89. Training Indian Tribal Police Officers, 1978 No. 18 Op. Att’y Gen. of the State of 
Wash. (June 1, 1978), available at 
http://www.atg.wa.gov/AGOOpinions/opinion.aspx?section=archive&id=15228#.Uv6vHU2Yb
cs (stating that Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission could provide 
training to tribal police officers through an interlocal agreement even though the 
Commission did not have express authority to train tribal police). 
 90. Compare OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 456.120 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 80 of the 
2014 Reg. Sess.), with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.82.070 (West, Westlaw through 2014 
Legis. effective through March 31, 2014). 
 91. See Reynolds, supra note 86, at 135–36 (comparing In re Condemnation of 30.60 
Acres of Land, 572 A.2d 242 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (upholding an agreement between a 
township and a school district to construct a school and park because both entities had 
condemnation authority, although the township could only condemn land for park purposes 
and the school could only condemn land for use as a public school), with Gallagher v. City of 
Omaha, 204 N.W.2d 157 (Neb. 1973) (invalidating an agreement between a university and 
 
210 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [VOL. 50 
 
Unlike a compact provision that is legally unnecessary, prohibitive 
of most agreements, and may stun officials who understand the nature 
and law of interstate compacts, the states’ variations on the required 
powers of the parties to an agreement reflect political value, judgment, 
and history. One approach enhances the powers of the parties to the 
agreement; the other approach only maintains the existing powers of 
the parties.92 I do not suggest that one approach is better than the other 
for intrastate intergovernmental agreements; however, states with bor-
der towns that have few opportunities to cooperate intrastate need 
broad authority and flexibility to cooperate with towns in the adjacent 
state to facilitate the town’s interdependent and interdisciplinary poten-
tial (i.e., resiliency). In other words, states might consider the former, 
more expansive approach for interstate intergovernmental agreements, 
even if they would follow the the latter, more limited approach for solely 
intrastate agreements. 
V. OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO CROSS-BORDER 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION 
Two remote border areas illustrate innovative ways that Oregon 
and Washington communities are overcoming legal barriers between the 
states. 
A. Leveraging Federal Authority in the National Scenic Area 
Cascade Locks in Oregon and Stevenson and North Bonneville in 
Washington are close in distance to each other, but remote relative to 
other intrastate neighbors.93 Cascade Locks is 20 miles west of Hood 
River, Oregon and 25 miles east of the Portland metropolitan area.94 To 
the north, it is adjacent to the Columbia River (and thus the state line 
                                                                                                                           
the city “to construct and use parking facilities on city park land” because neither entity “had 
the power to engage in all of the activities” of the agreement  . 
 92. Compare United Water Res., Inc. v. N.J. Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 685 A. d 
24, 31 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (concluding that the intergovernmental cooperation 
act “was not intended as a vehicle to enhance the enumerated powers granted to local 
units” , aff’d, 701 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1997), and Dahl v. City of Grafton, 286 N.W.2d 774, 780 
(N.D.  979  (“Cooperation agreements still must be limited to the performance of functions 
falling within the framework of the powers already possessed by the municipality under 
other statutes.” , and CP Nat’l Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Utah, 6 8 P. d 5 9, 5   (Utah 
1981) (citing Utah Code § 11-13-14, which states that municipalities may contract with one 
another “to perform any governmental service, activity, or undertaking which each public 
agency . . . is authorized by law to perform,” and concluding “the intent of the [ICA] appears 
to be to allow the municipalities collectively to exercise powers which they already possess 
individually.” , with Cnty. of Wabash v. Partee, 6 8 N.E. d 674, 679 (Ill. App. Ct.  99   (“The 
agreement is valid so long as either the city or the county has the right to undertake the task 
required under the agreement . . . . The very purpose of section 10 of article VII of the 1970 
Constitution is to allow a local government to do indirectly that which it cannot do directly, 
as long as it is otherwise lawful.” . 
 93. See RAND MCNALLY, THE 2013 ROAD ATLAS 108 (2013). 
 94. See id. 
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with Washington); to the south is Mt. Hood National Forest.95 Stevenson 
and North Bonneville are 25 miles west of White Salmon, Washington 
and 25 miles east of Camas, Washington.96 To their south is the Colum-
bia River (and thus the state line with Oregon);97 to their north is a 
combination of state and national forest land.98 The Bridge of the Gods 
over the Columbia River connects the cities and all three cities are lo-
cated within the federally designated Columbia River Gorge National 
Scenic Area.99 In     , these three cities developed a joint “White Pa-
per” describing their interest to identify and develop initiatives, priori-
ties, and shared roles; experiment with new and innovative ways to pro-
vide services to people and communities; and develop more effective and 
efficient methods of serving people.100 Specifically, the communities 
identified three priorities for cooperation—wastewater treatment, emer-
gency response services, and education and schools101—and each city 
enacted a resolution committing to those identified areas of coopera-
tion.102 The White Paper and each resolution referred to the unique le-
gal structure of the National Scenic Area as authority for their inter-
state intergovernmental cooperation.103  
The federal Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area Act creat-
ed the National Scenic Area and authorized Oregon and Washington to 
enact an interstate compact (the Columbia River Gorge Compact) to 
create a bi-state Columbia River Gorge Commission for the purpose of 
regional land use planning.104 The National Scenic Area Act has two 
purposes: first, “to protect and provide for enhancement of” Gorge re-
sources, and second “to protect and support the economy of the Colum-
bia River Gorge area by encouraging growth to occur in existing urban 
areas and” to allow economic development consistent with the first pur-
pose.105 Within the National Scenic Area, there are thirteen urban are-
                                                     
 95. See id. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id.  
 98. See id. 
 99. See id.; see generally Bridge of the Gods: Port of Cascade Locks, Oregon, PORT 
OF CASCADE LOCKS, OREGON, http://portofcascadelocks.org/bridge-of-the-gods/ (last visited 
May 21, 2014). 
100. White Paper Outlining the Three Cities’ Initiatives in Partnership with the 
Columbia River Gorge Commission (Mar. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Three Cities’ Initiatives] (on 
file with author). 
101. Id. 
102. CASCADE LOCKS, Or., Res. 1265 (2013); North Bonneville, Wash., Res. 456 
(2012); Stevenson, Wash., Res. 2013-256 (2013). 
103. CASCADE LOCKS, Or., Res. 1265 (2013); North Bonneville, Wash., Res. 456 
(2012); Stevenson, Wash., Res. 2013-256 (2013); Three Cities’ Initiatives, supra note 100. 
104. 16 U.S.C. § 544b (2012). The Columbia River Gorge Compact is codified at OR. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 196.150 (through end of the 2013 Reg. and Sp. Sessions) and WASH. REV. 
CODE § 43.97.015 (through all 2013 legislation). 
105. 16 U.S.C. § 544a (2012). 
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as,106 which have urban boundaries that the Commission may revise if 
the communities have met specified standards.107 The urban areas are 
nominally exempt from the land use regulations under the National 
Scenic Area;108 however, to qualify for an urban area boundary revision, 
the urban areas must demonstrate that the revision would be consistent 
with the purposes of and land use regulations for the National Scenic 
Area and that the revision “would result in maximum efficiency of land 
uses within and on the fringe of existing urban areas.”109 These stand-
ards thus make the Scenic Area authorities indirectly applicable to ur-
ban areas. 
Cascade Locks, North Bonneville, and Stevenson have specifically 
asserted that these authorities for the National Scenic Area authorize 
interstate intergovernmental cooperation necessary for the town’s eco-
nomic development independent of state law restrictions.110 These cities 
are thus asserting a form of localism, that is, obtaining authority direct-
ly from federal law, which would preempt conflicting state law.  
Localism is not new; however, it has received recent scholarly at-
tention111 following (but not all related to  the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
2004 decision in Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League,112 in which the 
Court concluded that the federal Telecommunications Act, which broad-
ly preempts state and local laws that prohibit the ability of any entity to 
provide telecommunication services, did not preempt a Missouri state 
law that prohibited political subdivisions from providing telecommuni-
cation services.113 The Court started its analysis in Nixon with its well-
trod preemption jurisprudence, stating that a federal act preempts state 
law when it contains an “unmistakably clear” statement to that effect.114 
However, the Court did not apply this standard further.115 Instead, the 
Court’s analysis turned to other factors.116 Relevant to the Three Cities’ 
White Paper, the Court reasoned, in part that if the FCC did preempt 
the state restriction, “[t]he municipality would be free of the statute, but 
freedom is not authority, and in the absence of some further, authoriz-
ing legislation the municipality would still be powerless to enter the tel-
                                                     
106. Id. § 544b(e). 
107. Id. § 544b(f). 
108. Id. § 544d(c)(5)(B). 
109. Id. § 544b(f)(2)(B)–(C). 
110. Three Cities’ Initiatives, supra note 100. 
111. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local 
Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959 (2007); Colloquium, Why the 
Local Matters: Federalism, Localism, and Public Interest Advocacy, Papers from the 
Eleventh Annual Liman Colloquium at Yale Law School (2008), available at 
http://www.law.yale.edu/why_the_local_matters_final_122109.pdf; Laurie Reynolds, A Role 
for Local Government Law in Federal-State-Local Disputes, 43 URB. LAW. 977 (2011). 
112. Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004). 
113. Id. at 128. 
114. Id. at 130 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991)). 
115. See id. at 131–35. 
116. See id. 
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ecommunications business.”117 The Court continued, “[t]here is, after all, 
no argument that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is itself a source 
of federal authority granting municipalities local power that state law 
does not.”118 Preemption has always been more complicated than the 
presence or absence of an “unmistakably clear” statement; it has always 
depended on the interrelationship between the federal and state stat-
utes at issue.119 Following Nixon, preemption may now also depend on 
the presence of other federal or state authority.120 
Cascade Locks’s, North Bonneville’s, and Stevenson’s initiatives are 
still in their infancy.121 There are too many unknown or undecided vari-
ables in those initiatives for this article to discuss whether the National 
Scenic Area Act is itself a source of authority for interstate intergov-
ernmental cooperation such that it would preempt the different powers 
issue, other statutory differences between Oregon and Washington’s in-
tergovernmental cooperation statutes,122 and specific state laws other-
wise applicable to the cities’ initiatives. Nevertheless the initiative’s 
progress is worth watching because regardless of the preemption issue, 
the cities’ assertion that their cooperation implements the second pur-
pose of the National Scenic Area Act, and thus the Columbia River 
Gorge Compact,123 may overcome the problem of only Washington hav-
ing a compact provision. In other words, the cities are suggesting that 
their agreements, which implement an existing compact, satisfy the 
purpose of the compact provision in Washington’s intergovernmental 
cooperation statute without needing to declare that each individual 
agreement is itself a compact.124 This novel argument also overcomes 
the consent problem discussed above because the Gorge Compact al-
ready has the consent of Congress.125 There should be no surprise that 
the agreement might have a “supra-state” effect because the Washing-
ton and Oregon courts have already acknowledged this in past jurispru-
dence relating to the National Scenic Area.126 
                                                     
117. Id. at 135. 
118. Id. 
119. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991). 
120. See Nixon, 541 U.S. at 135. 
121. See Three Cities’ Initiatives, supra note 100. 
122. For example, Oregon authorizes intergovernmental entities to issue revenue 
bonds. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 190.080(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 80 of the 2014 Reg. 
Sess.). But Washington statutes contain no such authority. 
123. See supra text accompanying notes 103, 104. 
124. See generally Three Cities’ Initiatives, supra note 100. 
125. See supra text accompanying note 104. 
126. E.g., Columbia River Gorge Comm’n v. Hood River Cnty.,  5  P. d 997, 1003–
 4 (Or. Ct. App.    7  (holding that Oregon’s    4 Ballot Measure  7 does not apply in the 
National Scenic Area because the land use regulations in the National Scenic Area are 
required by federal law); Klickitat Cnty. v. State, 862 P.2d 629, 634 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) 
(since the Gorge Compact was an instrument of federal law, “[t]he Commission’s land 
management plan and the act’s provisions relative to the plan are federally mandated.” . 
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Few border areas have an existing compact relating to land use 
planning that could serve as authority for interstate intergovernmental 
cooperation.127 Thus, the cities’ White Paper and resolutions to cooper-
ate under the authority of the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic 
Area Act constitutes one example of the innovative thinking necessary 
for small towns to cooperate across state lines. 
B. State Agreements and a Variance to Provide Emergency Services to 
Mill Creek Road 
Northeastern Umatilla County, Oregon is rural—very rural.128 The 
only reliable year-round access to its Mill Creek Road is from Walla 
Walla, Washington. In 2002, the Mill Creek Road area (officially Ambu-
lance Service Area #6 (“ASA” ) generated approximately 4 calls per 
year.129 Response time within the ASA from Milton-Freewater, Oregon 
is a minimum of 45 minutes; response from Walla Walla, Washington 
reduces that time to 20 minutes.130 
Providing faster emergency services to Mill Creek Road presented a 
statutory and regulatory problem for Umatilla County. Oregon statutes 
require a license from the Oregon Health Authority,131 and the cost of 
that license was approximately $3,000 per year.132 Oregon Health Au-
thority regulations do not require an out-of-state EMS provider to be 
licensed in Oregon when merely transporting a patient through the 
state (i.e., the patient does not originate in Oregon and is not being 
transported to a facility in Oregon), when transporting a patient from a 
facility in Oregon to a facility in another state, or when transporting a 
patient originating outside Oregon to a facility in Oregon.133 None of 
those exceptions applied to the Mill Creek Road situation because the 
transportation of a patient from Mill Creek Road, Oregon to Walla Wal-
la, Washington involved an out-of state EMS provider transporting a 
patient originating in Oregon to an out of state facility. 
The road to cross-border emergency services illustrates the com-
plexity of working in an area with conflicting state laws. In 1989, the 
                                                     
127. See, e.g., Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE § 
66800 (West 2013) and NEV. REV. STAT. § 277.200, consent granted by Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 
Stat 3233, 3253 (1980); Delaware Valley Regional Planning Compact, codified at N.J. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 32:27-1 to 32-27-30 and 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 701, consent granted by Pub. L. No. 87-
70, 75 Stat. 170 (1961). 
128. State & County QuickFacts Umatilla County, Oregon, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 
(Jan. 6, 2014, 17:37:09 EST), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/41/41059.html (stating 
that Umatilla’s population density was only 23.6 people per square mile in 2010). 
129. Letter from Thomas W. Johnson, Dir., Ctr. for Env’t and Health Sys., State of 
Or. Dep’t of Human Servs. Health Div., to William S. Hansell, Chairperson, Umatilla Cnty. 
Bd. of Comm’rs,   (June  6,       (on file with author). 
130. Id. 
131. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 682.045, 682.047 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 80 of the 
2014 Reg. Sess.). 
132. Letter from Thomas W. Johnson, supra note 129. 
133. Or. Admin. R. 333-265-0070 (2012). 
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Washington Department of Social and Health Services and the Oregon 
Department of Health (now Oregon Health Authority) entered into an 
agreement authorizing “ambulance services from either state [to …] 
transport a patient from that state into the other state, or they can 
transport a patient from the other state into their state.”134 However, 
this agreement was ambiguous concerning the practice of emergency 
medical response and the handling of complaints registered against a 
transporting agency.135 In 2000, when Umatilla County approached 
Walla Walla to provide services to the Mill Creek Road area, Walla Wal-
la would not rely on the agreement. In 2002, Umatilla County thus 
sought a variance from the Oregon Health Authority to allow Walla 
Walla EMS personnel to serve that portion of Umatilla County, which 
the Oregon Health Authority approved.136 That variance did not contain 
assurances concerning medical practice, risk, and authority that satis-
fied Walla Walla.137 Subsequently, the states clarified the 1989 Agree-
ment,138 which satisfied Walla Walla’s concerns. Only then did Umatilla 
County and Walla Walla finalize their agreement for Walla Walla to 
provide ambulance services to the Mill Creek Area of Umatilla Coun-
ty.139 
Unlike the three cities considering how to preempt state law, Walla 
Walla, Umatilla County, and the states’ health agencies worked togeth-
er on an innovative outside-the-box solution within existing state stat-
utes and regulations.  To the extent state agencies can broadly interpret 
their authorities or grant case-by-case variances, they can facilitate 
common-sense outcomes and overcome conflicting state laws. However, 
state agencies must be alert to do so comprehensively, clearly, and in a 
timely manner.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
A resilient community has redundancies and is interdependent on 
other communities. Yet, not all communities have the same opportuni-
ties to use intergovernmental agreements to create resiliency. Border 
communities that have no intrastate neighbors must rely on shared ser-
                                                     
134. Agreement between State of Wash. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. Emergency 
Med. Servs. and State of Or. Dep’t of Health Emergency Med. Servs. (Mar. 8,  989  
[hereinafter Agreement] (on file with author). This agreement is a type of interstate 
intergovernmental agreement. There is no mention of the agreement being considered an 
interstate compact as Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 39.34.040 (West 2013) requires. 
135. See Bd. of Comm’rs of Umatilla Cnty., Order No. BCC    -38 (Oct. 16, 2002) 
(on file with author). 
136. Letter from Thomas W. Johnson, supra note 129. 
137. City of Walla Walla, Agenda Item History Sheet (Nov. 20, 2002) (on file with 
author). 
138. Memorandum from Elizabeth E. Morgan, Program Representative, NREMT-P, 
to Grant Higginson, Acting Adm’r, OPHS, et al. (Oct. 7,       (on file with author). 
139. Agreement, supra note 134. 
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vices and joint infrastructure with communities in the adjoining state; 
however, the differences in the states’ authorities for interstate inter-
governmental agreements and conflicting state statutes and regulations 
limit opportunities for cross-border cooperation. 
Statutory authorities for mutual aid agreements and assistance are 
broad and overcome many of the hurdles posed by statutory and regula-
tory differences in times of emergency, but these statutes presume that 
communities have the basic services and infrastructure that they can 
use to provide that emergency aid. Interstate intergovernmental agree-
ments are a critical component to ensuring that basic level of services 
and infrastructure. As part of creating resilient communities, states 
must review their internal law to eliminate barriers to interstate coop-
eration or be willing to help or step out of the way of communities work-
ing for themselves. 
 
